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Abstract
The Intelligent Platform Management Interface (IPMI) is a protocol that allows administrators to 
manage servers remotely. Hardware vendors including Dell, HP, Supermicro, IBM, Lenovo, Fujitsu and 
Oracle support IPMI though a Baseboard Management Controller (BMC) which can either be integrated 
into the motherboard or purchased as a pluggable module. The BMC runs silently alongside other 
components o f the server and provides a lower level of hardware access than the Operating System (OS). 
This allows support for features like power cycling the server, mounting virtual media and accessing a 
remote console. The failure o f BMC vendors to produce a more secure product, along with the inherent 
flaws o f the IPMI protocol, increases the need for these systems’ security capabilities to be evaluated. The 
IPMI protocol and various vendor implementations o f the BMC has been the subject of recent scrutiny, 
and initial investigation has raised concerns about the security properties o f these components. This 
project focuses on evaluating specific IPMI supported hardware and software setup in an environment 
modeled to simulate real use, for the explicit purpose of evaluating the security o f the system. This project 
presents: several methods by which unprivileged users can gain remote access to the system, a list o f best 
practices for proper configuration, a guide to clearing configuration settings before decommission, and a 
basic Metasploit module to scan for BMC related services.
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1Introduction
According to Dan Farmer, “the de-provisioning o f old servers must be handled even more carefully, 
since eBay attacks and the like are a real threat,” (Farmer, 2013). There is a growing need to analyze the 
security of Baseboard Management Controllers (BMCs) and their implementations. This document 
chronicles the security problems associated with the Intelligent Platform Management Interface (IPMI) 
protocol, the various vender implementations and user configuration.
The goal o f this project is to provide best practices for user configuration and server decommission. 
We start out reviewing what BMCs are and why they are important for those systems to be secure. Then, 
we document how to set up a testing environment on a private network to configure Integrated Lights Out 
Interface (iLO) and Integrated Dell Remote Access Controller (iDRAC) devices. We then document how 
to recover network information from the previous setup and how to wipe data before server 
decommission. Finally we provide a Metasploit module to automate scanning for BMC related services 
for iLO and iDRAC.
2IPMI Background
In this section, we introduce the concepts o f IPMI and the BMCs that implement the protocol. We 
also describe why IPMI security is a relevant issue.
BMC Diagram
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Figure 1 -  BMC Diagram
What is a BMC?
BMCs play a crucial role in server administration. They typically have their own Central Processing 
Unit (CPU), memory and storage. They are integrated into the sever motherboard or purchased as a 
pluggable module or Peripheral Component Interconnect (PCI) card. They are designed to monitor server 
physical health and operate in emergency situations (i.e. even when the server is powered off). They 
typically run Linux and support services such as the Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP), Lightweight 
Directory Access Protocol (LDAP), Secure Shell (SSH), and telnet. Some even allow mounting remote 
media, capturing snapshots, and executing remote commands on the server. Therefore, whoever controls 
the BMC, controls the server.
3What is IPMI?
The IPMI is a protocol for remote server management originally developed by Intel along with Cisco, 
Dell, HP and NEC in 1998 (Farmer, 2013). There are two specifications: version 1.5 (2001) and version 
2.0 (2004) (Farmer, 2013). An embedded server called the Base Board Management Controller 
implements the IPMI protocol.
Why is Security an Issue in IPMI?
IPMI is a powerful utility that allows system administrators to resolve issues remotely that would 
otherwise need direct physical interaction. Take, for example, receiving a call at 4 am in the morning 
stating that a few servers are unresponsive and need to be power cycled. Instead o f having to crawl out of 
bed, get dressed and drive into work, the system administrator can login to the BMC and issue a power 
cycle remotely. Other notable power user utilities include remote access of the server and the ability to 
mount virtual media. However, with great power comes the great responsibility to ensure the security of 
the system, lest control fall into unauthorized hands. A malicious user that compromises the BMC has 
access privileges to the server that emulate a direct physical connection to the hardware. Imagine an 
invisible hacker running around in your data center with full physical access to all o f your hardware-that 
is essentially what happens when a BMC is compromised. Since IPMI is supported by a myriad of 
hardware vendors, this leads to three classes o f security vulnerability classifications: The IPMI protocol 
specification, the vendor implementation, and the configuration by end users. The goal o f this project is to 
gain a better understanding o f the vulnerabilities o f BMCs and to determine best practices for securing 
them.
4IPMI Security Threats
Since IPMI is supported by a myriad o f hardware vendors, this leads to three classes o f security 
vulnerability: the IPMI protocol specification, the vendor implementation, and the configuration by end 
users. In this section we will discuss examples o f security vulnerabilities for each of these categories.
IPM I Protocol
The IPMI specification has several known flaws which can allow users to intercept clear text 
passwords, grab password hashes and grant system level access without any password (Cipher 0), 
depending on the IPMI version and configuration (Farmer, 2013). This is accomplished though 
communicating with IPMI over a Local Area Network (LAN) using the Remote Management Control 
Protocol (RMCP) on port 623. Hewlett-Packard (HP) ships their BMCs with a unique, random, eight digit 
password for their BMCs. However, Dell ships their BMCs with the default credentials, “root/calvin.” 
Passwords are typically stored in plain text on the file system and the flash memory stores backups of 
previous firmware, which could lead to even further password recovery in relation to the history o f the 
server (Farmer, 2013). In our study, we were not able to gain root access to the iLO 2 or iDRAC 4 file 
systems (as vendors generally lock these types o f privileges). However, in our research, we found a 
method to gain root access to the iDRAC 5 file system by locating a reference to “vendor mode” in the 
iDRAC 5 source code and then issuing hidden Remote Access Controller Admin (racadm) commands to 
put the card in vendor mode (Nielsen, 2014).
5Vendor Implementation
Each vendor packages their IPMI implementation with a set o f preconfigured services which may 
lead to vulnerabilities if  they are not kept up to date. The update process is typically done through the web 
based interface which is similar to that o f a router. Upgrading IPMI related hardware does not require a 
server reboot, as BMCs are their own segregated system. Depending on the vendor, BMC firmware is 
either publically available or only available to users with a service contract. IBM and Oracle for example, 
both require service contracts (Farmer, 2013). Vendors typically abandon providing firmware and security 
updates to old BMC hardware. For example, Dell releases a new iDRAC hardware revision every 1 to 5 
years; the current hardware iteration for iDRAC being the iDRAC 7. Once a new BMC hardware 
specification is out, the vendor will typically phase out providing support and firmware updates for older 
models. Since BMCs typically run Linux, they fall under the GNU General Public License (GPL) license. 
Intel has made their source code available for their BMCs. However, this does not mean they have to 
support installing custom firmware on their system directly.
An implication o f lack o f transparency is that it would be very hard to remove a hacker whom had 
gained persistent access to the BMC. Since there is very little information available from BMC vendors 
about the hardware architecture, it is possible for an attacker to lock a legitimate user out forever (short of 
taking a hammer to the BMC) (Farmer, 2013). A recent example o f a vendor implementation issue is the 
recent vulnerabilities in Supermicro’s IPMI implementation that targeted buffer overflow attacks in the 
HTTP web interface, as well as a URL directory navigation attack due to lack o f input sanitization (i.e. 
grab any file from the file system) (Bonkoski, 2013).
6User Configuration
As noted in the “Related W ork” section, 60% of the IPMI 2.0 servers scanned, reported that Cipher 0 
was enabled which allows for passwordless authentication (Farmer, 2013). This is an example o f users 
taking the default configuration for granted, without assessing the security implications o f the related 
services and features directly. All o f the IPMI servers that were scanned were assigned public IP 
addresses. Users should be segregating IPMI supported devices on a private network and protecting them 
with a firewall. Lastly, there is the issue of minimum password length and complexity. If  the user does 
not have a strong password policy in place, it could lead to a compromise o f the hardware through brute 
force attack methods.
7Related Work
Dan Farmer, a security researcher in the DARPA Fast Track Program, published version 1 of his 
groundbreaking IPMI research at the beginning o f 2013 and stated, “there’s a desperate need for security 
research, articles, software tools, and discussion about the implications of IPMI and all it entails,” 
(Farmer, 2013). Farmer gathered data regarding IPMI related services by sending a, “Get Channel 
Authentication Capability,” packet to all IP addresses on the Internet in a 24 hour timeframe. Farmer 
noted, “312,357 IP addresses responded to the initial scan, with 295,364 replying with a valid IPMI 
response packet,” (Farmer, 2013). O f the replies, 2/3rds indicated that only IPMI version 1.5 was 
supported, with no cryptographic protection other than optional password hashing, (Farmer, 2013). O f the 
servers that supported IPMI version 2.0, it was determined that 57.8% had Cipher 0 enabled, which 
allows passwordless authentication (Farmer, 2013). There was a response in July from H.D. Moore, 
whom put together a set o f methods to exploit various vulnerabilities in IPMI with Metasploit, including 
Cipher 0 authentication and password hash dumping via the IPMI 2.0 RAKP Authentication Remote 
Password Hash Retrieval Vulnerability (Moore, 2013). H.D. More is the developer o f the Metasploit 
framework, a penetration testing software suite, and the founder o f the Metasploit Project. He is currently 
Chief Research Officer at Rapid7 (Moore, 2013). In August o f 2013 a paper titled, “Illuminating the 
Security Issues Surrounding Lights-Out Server Management,” was published and included a proof of 
concept buffer overflow exploit for Supermicro devices (Bonkoski, 2013). On November 6th, H.D. Moore 
published “Supermicro IPMI Firmware Vulnerabilities,” which disclosed buffer overflow vulnerabilities 
in Supermicro’s IPMI web interface (CVE-2013-3621, CVE-2013-3623) (Moore, 2013). Moore also 
disclosed a vulnerability targeting url_redirect.cgi which allows a “directory traversal attack due to lack 
of sanitization,” which would allow an attacker access to any content on the file system (Moore, 2013). 
On November 15th Juan Vazquez, a security researcher for Raid7, published a functional exploit in 
response to H.D. Moore’s CVE-2013-3621 vulnerability (Vazquez, 2013).
8Project Scope
The IPMI protocol and the BMCs that support it provide an enormous set o f investigation 
opportunities. To make the analysis o f IPMI supported systems more manageable for this research effort, 
the following scope limitations were imposed on this project:
1) Set up a test bed for IPMI related hardware on a private network.
2) Document how to configure iLO to harden against security vulnerabilities.
3) Document how to wipe data before disposing the server.
4) Build a module in Metasploit to automate testing for services related to the HP IPMI 
implementation known as the Integrated Lights Out Interface (iLO).
5) Look at iDRAC (Dell’s implementation) if  there was time (i.e. stretch goal).
Lab Setup & Configuration
It is imperative to ensure that BMCs are only exposed on a segregated, private network to avoid 
unwanted attention. In this section, we will discuss setting up a private network to create a test bed for 
IPMI supported hardware. We gathered four HP servers and one Dell server which had been previously 
decommissioned from UAFs surplus center. We installed Ubuntu 12.04 LTS on one o f the HP servers 
with Metasploit and ipmitools. We then set up a testing environment with the remaining three HP servers 
and one Dell server on our private network.
9Network Configuration
Figure 2 - Network Configuration
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Configuring a Cisco Switch
1) Find the serial port by running the command:
desmg |grep tty
. Sufcuntu'-S daeag | ffcep tty 
[ 0-003000] console [ ,03 enabled
[ O,. 915732] 00:06: ' vSO «  I/O 0*3f6 (irq - *} is * I6S50A
[ G-93SS93] secial^iSOi f  .31 at I/O 0x2f& (irq - 3 )  la a 1*550*.
Su&ymuJ-S I
2) Therefore, we will be connecting on /dev/ttyS0
3) The program we will be using to connect to the serial port is called Minicom. First we must 
install the package by running the command:
sudo apt-get install minicom
4) Next, we run the following command to configure the setup:
sudo minicom -s
5) Now we select “Serial port setup” and specify these settings:
Serial Device 
Lockfile Location.
Callin Program 
Callout Program 
Bps/Par/Bits 
Hardware Flow Control 
Software Flow Control
/dev/ttySO
/var/lock
Change which setting? |
Screen and keyboard 
Save setup as cisco 
Save setup as..
Exit
Exit from Minicom
11
6) Finally we save the configuration file:
+---- [ configuration]---- — +
| File |Give name to save this configuration? 1
| Serial> cisco| 1
| Screen and keyboard i
| Save setup as dfl 1
I] Save setup as.. ■
| Exit i
| Exit from Minicom 1
+----------------------- — +
7) To launch a Minicom session using our configuration we type the command:
sudo minicom cisco
NOTICE TO DSERS
This computer system is the property of ASSERT at UAF. Only ASSERT 
Lab Administrators are authorised users for this device. Unauthorised 
users, including ASSERT Lab users, are PROHIBITED. Users (authorized 
or unauthorized) have no explicit or implicit expectation of privacy. 
Any or all uses of this system may be subject to one or more of the 
following actions: interception, monitoring, recording, auditing, 
inspection, and disclosing to security personnel and law enforcement 
personnel, as well as authorized officials of other institutions or 
agencies. By using this system, the user consents to these actions. 
Unauthorized or improper use of this system may result in academic 
disciplinary action and civil and criminal penalties. By accessing 
this system you indicate your awareness of and consent to these terms 
and conditions of use. DISCONTINUE ACCESS IMMEDIATELY if you do not 
agree to the conditions stated in this notice.
assert-swl>AT 57=45 50=0 LI VI X4 £cl El Q0 
% Invalid input detected at marker. 
assert-swl>|
8) Now we’re connected to the switch! This switch was already preconfigured.
12
Setting up the Network
On one o f the HP servers we installed Ubuntu 12.04 LTS to access the BMCs remotely, run 
ipmitools, and the Metasploit framework. eth0 is the public network on Figure 2. eth1 is the switch that 
we set up as a private network for connecting our BMCs on Figure 2.
1) First run the command:
sudo nano /etc/network/interfaces
I This file dhe strikes the neCTOrk interfaces ivaliable on your nyBtem 
t how «. vhr=" F*r IflfotsrtC-l**, i t i  irtTerffcfces (5) .
I Th* 1 ciopbrt.2lf jtetucFle intesfus*
B 'J t Q  l O
i£ace la mec loopback 
auta etbO
i E-ace etbO Lnet static 
address 19§.1 .  X.X 
Utraaafc 1IS.111 X.X 
l)),t*S X.X
gittnv x.x
i £ a c e  e t h i  i n . e c  s t a t i c
address 10.10.10.3 
netitssk 2SS„2SS.J51.0 
network 10.10.10.9 
bceadeast 10,10,10.255
2) Now we run the command:
sudo /etc/init.d/networking restart
3) Finally we run the command ifconfig to verify that our network is configured properly:
t C M  Zonk encap:Ethernet HKaddr 00:15:60;Oc:XZX
X.X Beast; 199.1*5.X . X  H M  X.X
lft«c6 addr: fe80::215:«0ff:XIX
DP BROADCAST RUXNIW3 MULTICAST MTU:1500 Metric:1 
RX packets:36 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 fra®e:0 
TX packets;31 errors;0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0 
colll»ions:0 txqueuelen;1000
RX bytea:3362 (3.3 KB) TX bytes:3994 <3.9 KB)
Interrupt:25
etbl Link encap:Ethernet MMaddr 00:15:60:0c:76:09
inet addr:10.10.10.3 Beast:10.10.10.255 Mask:2S5.255.2S5.0
m e t 6 addr: feSO:r215:60ff:fe0c:7809/61 3cope:Link
OP BROADCAST ROMMIMS MULTICAST MTOilSOO Metric:1
RX packet*:0 error#:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 fra»e:0
TX packets:3 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0
collisions:0 txqueuelen:1000
RX bytes:0 <0.0 B) TX bytes:2S0 (250.0 B>
Interrupt:26
13
4) To test the configuration connected, we connected directly to the switch and SSH’d into the 
Ubuntu box:
i f L a . l i O . l O . l 'v  p u n a r i i :
H » L c « m  TO C b a n t i .  1 1 9  l O n / L u i u c  J  . 1 .  J 3  - Q ta m t  i c  l 4 I « :.
* Cc-:>j»en«:-«T.ic-n : L K p i : /  / b r l p . u h i n t ’i  i
4VPC4B I (if^ iut Lit 11 G* »?v 4 U£JT 3«3
J T v e a  l o a d :  4 . 0  Ft o c v v j * * :  LDJ
1 m+i *  Sri / I  ii.SRi o f  C3.QLGB C j f t t i i  L o f ] H  im t  I
M H jy  wMati a l Sf r«r t u r t i  I f l .a M  X .X
S««5- m»?«: E'H il itiCTn rex vttiL! IP.IP. IP.3
'I r if .-f i c h a p  a i l  i. *r.-i u r j . ] *  s r . u  i v i e m  * c  f f  . p u f t i  cm 1. .cqm tf
LtaC login; Hoo, Xcv 4 11:17:11 2DS3
. i ^: -1 |
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Integrated Lights Out Interface (iLO)
In this section we will discuss: iLO configuration, an example o f misconfiguration, data recovery, and 
proper methods for wiping data before server decommission.
iLO Configuration
Now that we have our private network setup, it’s time to configure iLO to be able to connect via 
LAN.
1) On POST press F8 to enter the Integrated Lights-Out Advanced configuration utility:
4096 MB Initialized / 4096 MB Detected
ProLiant System BIOS - P52 (06/01/2005)
Copyright 1982 , 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Group, L.P.
Processor 1 initialized at 3.40 GHz/800 MHz(l Mbyte L2)
Processor 2 initialized at 3.40 GHz/800 MHz(l Mbyte L2)
Advanced Memory Protection Mode: Advanced ECC Support
Redundant ROM Detected - This system contains a valid backup system ROM.
1615-Power Supply Failure, or Power Supply Unplugged in Bay 2
Integrated Lights-Out Advanced press [F83 to configure___________________
15
2) Next, go to Network->Network Autoconfiguration and make sure that “DHCP Enable” is set to 
“OFF”:
3) Now, go to Network->Network Configuration and enter in the appropriate network information:
16
4) Finally, go to User->Add and create a new user:
5) The destination should now be reachable:
@ubuntu:~$ ping 10.10.10.5
FING 10. 10.10. 5 (10.10.10.5) 56(34} bytes of data.
64 bytes from. 10.10.10.5 icmp req=l ttl=64 tiir.e =0 . 35 3 ms
64 bytes from. 10.10.10.5 icmp req=2 ttl=64 tiir.e=G . 473 ms
64 bytes f roir. 10.10.10.5 icmp req=3 ttl=64 tiir.e =0 .435 ms
64 bytes f roir. 10.10.10.5 icmp req=4 ttl=64 tiir.e =0 .432 ms
64 bytes f roir. 10.10.10.5 icmp req=5 ttl=64 tiir.e =0 .4 34 ms
64 bytes f roir. 10.10.10.5 icmp req=6 ttl=64 tiir.e =0 .437 ms
64 bytes f roir. 10.10.10.5 icmp req=7 ttl=64 tiir.e =0 .435 ms
64 bytes f roir. 10.10.10.5 icmp req=3 ttl=64 tiir.e=G . 433 ms
  10.10.10.5 ping statistics --
■5 packets transmitted, 8 received, 0% packet loss, tiir.e VOOOir.s 
rtt ir.in/avg/max/mdev = 0 . 473/0 . 531/0 . 35 3/0 .12 6 ir.s 
§utamtu:~$ I
17
Example o f  Misconfiguration
Telnet is enabled on port 23. We were able to use tcpdump to sniff passwords and communication in
plaintext during connection.
1) Start tcpdump capture:
@ubuntu:~$ sudo tcpdump -i ethl -s 65535 -w test.pcap 
[sudo] password for swclayton3:
tcpdump: listening on ethl, link-type EN10MB (Ethernet), capture size 65535 byte 
s
*C 2 S2 packets captured 
252 packets received by filter 
0 packets dropped by kernel 
@ubuntu:~$ f
2) Telnet into BMC:
@ubuntu:/hame$ telnet 10.10.10.5 
rying 10.10.10.5... 
onnected to 10.10.10.5. 
scape character is ,A]1. 
ogin Name: ExampleLogin
assvord: ***************
ser:ExampleUser logged-in to ilo. (10.10.10.5)
LO Advanced 1.80 pass21 at 18:05:43 Jul 12 2005 
erver Name: 
erver Power: On
/>hpiLO-> help 
tatus=0
tatus tag=COMMAND COMPLETED
3) Scp the pcap file over to Windows box:
S scp -P 80 USER @i3 7 . 229 .x.x :/home/ user /test, pcap test, pcap 
user @137.2 2 9 . ’ s password: 
test, pcap 10096 19KB 19.3KB/s 00:00
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4) Open the pcap in Wireshark:
4 test, p ca p [Wireshark 1.10.3 (S V N  Rev 53022 from /trunk-1.10)]
File Edit View Go Capture Analyze Statistics Telephony Tools nternals Help
©  ® I J b  e  u  m 1 ^  + *  «  ¥  £  1 B □ I Q .  Q  ED
v EFilter: telnet xpression... Clear Apply Save
No. Time Source Destination Protocol Length Info
e 3. 018458 10. 10.10. 3 10.10. 10. 5 TELNET 81 T e ln e t D a ta  . . .
9 3. 020201 1 0 .10 .1 0 . 5 10 .10 .10 . 3 TELNET 69 T e l n e t D a ta  . . .
11 3.0202 82 1 0 .1 0 .1 0 .  3 1 0 .1 0 .1 0 .  5 TELNET 66 T e l n e t D a ta  . . .
12 3. 022840 1 0 .1 0 .1 0 .  5 1 0 .1 0 .1 0 .  3 TELN ET 60 T e l n e t D a ta  . . .
14 3. 059661 1 0 .1 0 .1 0 .  5 1 0 .1 0 .1 0 .  3 TELNET 113 T e ln e t D a ta  . . .
18 4 .0 6 7 9 7 1 1 0 .1 0 .1 0 .  3 1 0 .1 0 .1 0 .  5 TELN ET 5 5 T e l n e t D a ta  . . .
19 4 .0 7 0 5 5 6 1 0 .1 0 .1 0 .  5 1 0 .1 0 .1 0 .  3 TELNET 60 T e ln e t D a ta  . . .
5) Right click on the first packet and click “Follow TCP Stream”:
M Follow TCP Stream
Stream Content
.........................................7 .........# . . , .....................................................[ 1 i .  [0 ; 1 ; 3 7 ; 40m. [23.  [ l ; l H L o g i n
Name: ..................... ---------------------- J#EExxaam m ppl 1 e e L L o o g g i  i  nn | Username is ExampleLogin
P a s s w o r d  : lE ^ X ^ a^ m ^ D *! * e * P * a * S * S * W * Q * r * d * l  Password is ExamplePassword
. [ 23.  [ 1 ;1 h .  [2 J .  L I ;  lH U s e r  : Examp le u s e r  lo q g e d - in  t o  u a a c a c h e - i l o .  ( 1 0 . 1 0 .1 0 .  5)
iL O  A d v a n c e d  1 .8 0  p a s s 2 1  a t  1 8 : 0 5 : 4 3  JuT  12  2005
s e r v e r  Name: u a a c a c h e
S e r v e r  P o w e r : On
< / > h p i  L O ->  |hheelT j3£] All commands sent are unencrypted 
s t a t u s = 0
s ta tu s_ ta g = C 0 M M A N D  c o m p l e t e d
6) This can be fixed by going to Administration->Global Settings, disabling “Remote Console
Port Configuration,” and ensuring “Remote Console Data Encryption” is enabled.
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Recovering Data
Information related to the network a server was hosted on, can be found in the BMC settings at 
startup. From the servers we picked up at surplus we were able to grab network related information from 
the iLO settings. This could allow an attacker to gain information related to the current network 
infrastructure of the environment it was previously decommissioned from. This could have been avoided 
if  the previous owners had gone into the settings and restored the factory default configuration. BMCs 
passwords are typically universal in an enterprise environment and are updated rarely due to the 
inconvenience o f password management. An attacker could dump passwords from a previously 
decommissioned server with the IPMI 2.0 RAKP Authentication Remote Password Hash Retrieval 
Vulnerability or by developing an exploit to gain root access to the file system. The iLO servers discussed 
in the next few sections do not support the IPMI 2.0 and there is no known exploit for gaining root access 
to the file system. However, the passwords are sitting there on the iLO file system, waiting to be 
uncovered. The file system resides onboard the integrated BMC. Thus, the only way to completely thwart 
the most determined hackers is to physically take a hammer to the board before decommission. It is truly 
saddening to see such a primitive solution that destroys the functionality o f the board which could be 
avoided by vendors supporting custom firmware, as well as providing transparency and documentation 
with their BMCs.
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1) On POST press F8 to enter the Integrated Lights-Out Advanced configuration utility:
4096 MB Initialized / 4096 MB Detected
ProLiant System BIOS - P52 (06/01/2005)
Copyright 1982, 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Group, L.P.
Processor 1 initialized at 3.40 GHz/800 MHz(l Mbyte L2)
Processor 2 initialized at 3.40 GHz/800 MHz(l Mbyte L2)
Advanced Memory Protection Mode: Advanced ECC Support
Redundant ROM Detected - This system contains a valid backup system ROM.
1615-Power Supply Failure, or Power Supply Unplugged in Bay 2
Integrated Lights-Out Advanced press [F8] to configure___________________
2) Next, go to Network->Network Autoconfiguration to see the DNS name:
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3) Press F1 to gather more detailed information:
4) Now, go to Network->Network Configuration:
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5) Finally, go to Network->Directory:
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Server Decommission
The iLO web based interface allows users to clear some of the BMC settings in preparation for server 
decommission. However, as discussed in the previous section, it should be noted that this information is 
still typically floating around on the BMC’s file system. As with most firmware upgrade processes, BMC 
vendors typically store several backups o f the file system from previous firmware upgrades. This could 
allow a hacker to potentially compromise multiple previous owners o f the hardware. Vendors don’t allow 
root access to the file system but, this hasn’t stopped researchers from gaining access on specific vendor 
implementations (Nielsen, 2014). Therefore, until vendors provide transparency o f their BMCs, and 
support to remove such files, the only way to truly ensure no trace of data is left behind is to physically 
destroy the BMC. Below are instructions to clear easily accessible information:
1) Under “System Status” navigate to “iLO Event Log,” scroll down and click “Clear Event Log.” 
The iLO Event Log keeps track of power, clock settings, server resets, user logins, etc.
2) Under “System Status” navigate “iLO Event Log,” scroll down and click “Clear IML.” The iLO 
Management Log (IML) keeps track of warning and error messages.
3) Under “Administration” navigate to “User Administration” and delete each user. The User 
Administration section keeps track of users and their associated privileges.
4) Under “Administration” navigate to “Network Settings” and clear the “IP Address,” “Subnet 
Mask” and “Gateway IP Address” fields. Clear the fields under “Advanced Configuration 
Parameters” and click “Apply.”
5) Under “Administration” navigate to “SNMP/Insight Manager Settings,” clear all fields and click 
“Reset Settings.” The SNMP/Insight Manager Settings configures the SNMP Alerts server 
destination and configuration.
6) Under “Administration” navigate to “Directory Settings,” clear all fields and click “Apply 
Settings.” The Directory Settings section allows configuration o f directory server authentication.
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7) Under “Administration” navigate to “SSH Key Authorization” and remove any “Authorized SSH 
Keys.” The SSH Key Authorization section allows setting up authorized SSH keys for an SSH 
session.
8) Under “Administration” navigate to “Two-Factor Authentication” and click “Delete this Trusted 
CA Certificate” if  applicable. The Two-Factor Authentication section allows setting a Trusted CA 
Certificate.
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Integrated Dell Remote Access Controller (iDRAC)
In this section we will discuss: iDRAC configuration, iDRAC IPMI over LAN setup, data recovery 
and proper methods for wiping data before server decommission.
iDRAC Configuration
Next we will look at how to set up Dell’s iDRAC.
1) On POST press CTRL+D to enter the Dell Remote Access Controller Setup
Dell Renote Access Controller 4/1 Setup 
Firnuare Uersion 1.75 (Build 06.03) 
<IC Current TCP/IP Configuration (fron DHCP Server):
)NS Current Configuration (S ta tic  Servers, >onain Nan
Servers: 137.229. x.x 137.229. x.x
'IlC TCP/IP Configuration Options
Use DHCP is :  Enabled <D> to toggle DHCP
Ethernet Configuration Options (Mfli
NIC is t  Enabled
fluto-Negotiate is :  Enabled
Address is :  00 13:72:64 :X:X ) 
<E> to toggle Enable 
<fl> to toggle fluto-Neg
DNS Configuration Options
Servers fron DHCF 
Static DNS Server 
Static DNS Server 
ilid ed it RfiC None
;Esc> Exit Setup or <Paye Doun> for nore settings  
Press letter for gour selection  fron the above nenu
, fron DHCP: Disabled <U> to enable
DNS Server 1: 137.229. X.X <1> to chanye
DNS Server 2: 137.229. x.X (2} to change
;i RRC Nane: Disabled (C) to enable
2) Press “E” to enable NIC under “Ethernet Configuration Options.”
3) Next, enter the appropriate network information.
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IP M I Over L A N
IPMI Over LAN allows users to configure the BMC directly via the IPMI 1.5 or 2.0 protocol. The 
iLO servers that were decommissioned did not support IPMI over LAN. The iDRAC servers supported 
the 1.5 protocol. The IPMI 1.5 protocol only supports optional password hashing. This means that IPMI 
1.5 is “vulnerable to a plethora o f network security attacks such as password sniffing, network spoofing, 
connection hijacking, Man-in-the-Middle attacks, and more,” (Farmer, 2013). The main vulnerabilities in 
the IPMI protocol do not exist in version 1.5 as the RAKP Authentication Remote Password Hash 
Retrieval and Cipher 0 vulnerabilities were introduced in version 2.0. iDRAC servers are natively 
configured to salt the password before using a MD5 hashing algorithm. IPMI, “uses a dynamic hash for 
an authentication code to validate a request,” (Farmer, 2013).
AuthCode =  M D5 (passw ord  +  Temp Session ID  +  challenge string +  password).
“The challenge string and session ID are determined by the remote client and the managed BMC prior 
to this request, and may change with any session request, and without the clear text password at hand this 
hash could not be calculated,” (Farmer, 2013). In our test bed, a Wireshark capture o f the communication 
did not allow the interception of a password. Although, all other communication was unencrypted.
In 1.5 to generate an AuthCode a signature is first created, using the data you’d like to authenticate, a 
random number sent by the BMC, a sequence number, and the signature algorithm type; this is then in 
turn hashed along with the password and the authentication algorithm type. The BMC may then 
verify that you’ve sent the correct data and have used the proper password. (Farmer, 2013).
Even though this deters MITM attacks or connection hijacking, a hacker can still glean useful 
resonance data from the unencrypted data. Such information includes the user name used to authenticate 
the session, the precise hashing algorithm, and the existence of users with null passwords.
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1) Here is the first packet sent from the Ubuntu server (10.10.10.3) to the iDRAC IPMI Over 
LAN server (10.10.10.8) where the Get Channell Authentication Capabilities command has 
been issued and the requested privilege level is set to Administrator:
10 2.329769 10.10.10.3 10.10.10.. E IPMl/ATt 65 Req, Get channel Auther
:
Ji Frar*e 10: 6S bytes on wire C520 bits), 65 bytes captured (520 bits)
U Ethernet n r src: Hewlett-_0< :78:09 (00:15:60:0c:78:09), DSt: 0ellEsgP_e6:96:96 (00:11:43:e6:96:96; 
±i internet protocol versions, src: io.10.10.3 (io. io. io. 3). ost: 10.10.10.8 (10.10.10.8)
♦i user oatagrar* Protocol, 5rc Port: 4S189 (45189), ost Port: asf-rmcp (623)
3 Remote management control protocol, class: ipmi 
version: Ox&6 
Sequence: Oxff 
e Type: Normal rvcp, class: ipwi 
...o o m  » class: i m i  (0x07)
0........ * Message Type: Noriwal rmcp (0x00)
3 ipmi vl.5 session wrapper, session id 0x0 
Authentication Type: moke (OxOO)
Session Sequence Number: 0x00000000 
session ID: 0x00000000 
Message Length: 9 
a Intelligent Platform Management Interface 
fR»spomK» in: 111
Header: Get channel Authentication capabilities (Request) from 0x81 to 0x20 
Target Address: 0x20 
a Target l u m : 0x00, NetFN: Application Request (0x06)
Header checksum OxcS (correct)
Source Address: 0x81
faj 1 scqmq: 0*00_________________
| command: Get channel Authentication capabilities (0x38)| Command sent 
G Oat a
p version compatibility: Backward compatible w ith  ii=m i 1 . 5 ,  channel: current channel (OxOe)
a Requested privilege level: |Administrator | Requested privilege level for user 
Data checksum: 0x35 (correct)
2) Here is the response packet from the iDRAC server where the hashing algorithms, 
authentication settings, and existence of null login credentials are stated:
11 2.400774 72 Rsp, Get Channel Authentication ca
Session ID: 0x00000000 
Message Length: 16 
B Intelligent Platform Management interface 
fResponse to: 101
[Responded in: 0.071005000 seconds]
B Header: Get channel Authentication capabilities (Response) from 0x20 to 0x81 
Target Address: 0x81 
S Target LUN: 0x00, NetFN: Application Response (0x07)
Header checksum: 0x63 (correct) 
source Address: 0x20
ffl source LUN: 0x00, SeqNo: 0x00__________________________
Command: |Get Channel Authentication Capabilities (0x38)1 Command being sent. 
Completion code: command completed Normally (0x00)
B Data
a channel: channel #1 (0x01)
. .0.
.. .0
B version compatibility: Backward compatible with ipmi 1.5, |m d 5: supported, MD2:
0.......= version compatibility: Backward compatible with ipmi 1.5 (0)
oem proprietary authentication: Not supported 
= straight password/key: Not supported 
MD5: Supported
- MD2: supported_________
....... 0 = ijjo auth: Not supported I No authentication supported
B Per-message Authentication disabled, Non-null usernames enabled
.. 0.....= KG: set to default (0)
.. .1 .
supported Hashing algorithms
0. . 
.1.
. . 0
: Per-message Authentication disabled: True 
: user-level Authentication disabled: False 
Non-null usernames enabled: True 
: Null usernames enabled: False 
= Anonymous login enabled: False
Authentication settings and exsistance of null and anonymous logins.
B  supported connections: None
...... 0. = IPMI v2.0: False
....... 0 = IPMI vl. 5: False
OEM ID: 0
OEM Auxiliary data: 0x00 
Data checksum: 0x8d (correct)
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3) Here is the response from the Ubuntu Server where the hashing algorithm and user name is 
stated:
12 2.400850 10.10.10.3 10.10.10.8
S  Frame 12: 80 bytes on wire (640 bits), 80 bytes captured (640 bits) 
0  Ethernet II, src: Hewlett-_0c:78:09 (00:15:60:0c:78:09), Dst: DellEs 
S  internet Protocol version 4, src: 10.10.10.3 (10.10.10.3), Dst: 10.1 
0  user Datagram Protocol, src Port: 45189 (45189), Dst Port: asf-rmcp 
S  Remote Management control Protocol, class: i pm i 
version: 0x06 
sequence: Oxff 
El Type: Normal r m c p , class: ipmi 
...0 0111 = Class: IPMI (0x07)
0......... = Message Type: Normal r m c p (0x00)
Q  ipmi vl.5 session wrapper, session ID 0x0 
Authentication Type: none (0x00) 
session sequence Number: 0x00000000 
session ID: 0x00000000 
Message Length: 24 
0  intelligent Platform Management interface 
[Response in: 131 
0  Header: Get session challenge (Request) from 0x81 to 0x20 
Target Address: 0x20 
S  Target lun: 0x00, NetFN: Application Request (0x06)
Header checksum: 0xc8 (correct) 
source Address: 0x81 
S  source LUN: 0x00, seqNo: 0x01
command: Get session challenge (0x39)
B  Data
0  A u r h p n r i r a r i n n  Ty p p :  MnS__________________________
  0010 = kuthentication Type: MD5 (0x02)1
|User Name: root | username in plaintext 
Data checksum: 0x7c (correct)
Hashing algorithm used
4) Here is the response from the iDRAC server where the Temporary Session ID and challenge 
used for salting the password is stated:
13 2.482814 10.10.10.8
14 2.482972 10.10.10.3
10.10.10.3
10.10.10.8
0  Frame 13: 84 bytes on wire (672 bits), 84 bytes captured (67
96 (00:11:43:e6:96:96), Dst 
10.10.10.8 (10.10.10.8), C 
asf-rmcp (623), Dst Port:
0 Ethernet II, src: DellEsgP_e6:96:
0  internet Protocol version 4, src:
0  User Datagram Protocol, Src Port:
0  Remote Management control Protocol, class: i p m i 
version: 0x06 
sequence: Oxff 
□  Type: Normal r m c p , class: ipm i 
...0 0111 = class: IPMI (0x 07)
0......... = Message Type: Normal r m c p (0x 00)
0  ipmi vl.5 session wrapper, session ID 0x0 
Authentication Type: none (0x00) 
session sequence Number: 0x00000000 
session ID: 0x00000000 
Message Length: 28 
0  intelligent Platform Management interface 
fResponse to: 121
[Responded in: 0.081964000 seconds]
B  Header: Get session challenge (Response) from 0x20 to 0x81 
Target Address: 0x81 
0  Target LUN: 0x00, NetFN: Application Response (0x07) 
Header checksum: 0x63 (correct) 
source Address: 0x20 
s source LgN: QxQQ, S&qNo; QxQl
command: Get session Challenge (0x39) | Command being issued, 
completion code: command completed Normally (0x00)
0  Data ____________
Temporary session ID: 10x02003300 | JsedforSalt 
Challenge: |4144ca4ce3e66e20737504b2ele3722e | used for Salt 
Data checksum: 0x7a (correct)
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5) Here is the response from the Ubuntu server with the authentication code. The authentication 
code is dynamically generated and cannot be used to spoof a connection:
14 2.482972 1 0 .1 0 .1 0 .3 10.10.10.8 IPMI/AT< 101 Re
Frame 14: 101 b y te s  on w ire  (808 b i t s ) ,  101 b y te s  c a p tu re d  (808 b i t s ;
©Ethernet II, Src: Hewlett-_0c:78:09 (00:15:60:0c:78:09), Dst: DellEsgP_e6:96:£ 
©internet Protocol version 4, src: 10.10.10.3 (10.10.10.3), Dst: 10.10.10.8 (1C 
©  user Datagram Protocol, src Port: 45189 (45189), Dst Port: asf-rmcp (623)
©  Remote Management control Protocol, class: IPMI 
version: 0x06 
sequence: Oxff 
B  Type: Normal r m c p , class: i pm i 
...0 0111 = Class: IPMI (0x07)
0........ = Message Type: Normal r m c p  (0x 00)
©  IPMI vl.5 session wrapper, session ID 0x2003300 
Authentication Type: MD5 (0x02) 
session sequence Number: 0x00000000
0x02003300 em porary se ss io n  ID a ss 'gned  in ast packet.
c2321ab6e7cf4d92cf823cd694794a89
Session ID:
Authentication code:
Message Length: 29 
©  intelligent Platform Management interface 
[Response in: 151 
©  Header: Activate session (Request) from 0x81 to 0x20 
Target Address: 0x20 
© Target LUN: 0x00, NetFN: Application Request (0x06) 
Header checksum: 0xc8 (correct) 
source Address: 0x81 
© source LUN: 0x00, seqNo: 0x02 
command: Activate session (0x3a)
E  Dat a _____
© Authentication Type:
Authentication code
MD5 H a sh 'n g  a gorfthm.
© Requested Maximum Privilege Level: Administrator
challenge string/Auth code: fl44ca4ce3e66e20737504b2ele3722e 
initial outbound sequence Number 
Data checksum: 0x43 (correct)
Pr~v~ ege eve for command.
Cha ange string.
0x401d3073
30
Enabling IP M I Over L A N
In this section we will configure the iDRAC 4 card to enable IPMI Over LAN.
1) On POST press Ctrl+E to enter the IPMI Server Management Configuration Utility:
  IW! Server Nanagenent Configuration U til ity  -----
Copyright 2H3-2BM f e l l  Inc. All Rights Reserved 1.1
i*seto irt Nanagenent Controller fev is im
Backplane Finnan! Revision
l.ZJ
1.00
11*1 0«er UM .............................  -
INI UM Chanel . . <ENTER)Jser Configuration ....................
feset In Ref as It .......................
k s t  f e e  S tr ia g ....................... .................. <0IIER>
2) Next, go to “IPMI LAN Channel” and enter the appropriate network information:
  IBII Server Nanagenent Configuration U t i l i t y -----
Copyright 2M3-28M f e l l  | K . All Rights Reserved 1.1
baseboard Nanagenent Controller Revision 
binary Backplane Firnuare Revision
Ethernet IP Address
NAC Address ...........................
Subnet Nash ...........................
............ 169.254. x.x
............88:11.43 :BB:X:X
............  255.255.8M.Mi
Default Gateway ................... ............8M.8M.8M.aaa
ULflM Enable
.Down Arrow to se lect | SPftCH,•.
3) Finally go to “User Configuration” and change the root password (the default is “calvin”).
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Recovering Data
Similar to iLO, data pertaining to the previous setup can be found in the configuration menus that are 
shown in the section, “iDRAC Configuration.” More information can be recovered by creating a new user 
and navigating through the iDRAC’s web based interface, which is similar to iLO. The web based 
interface is explored in the section, “Server Decommission.”
Server Decommission
There is a method for gaining root access on the iDRAC 5 file system by employing the use o f the 
hidden Remote Access Controller Admin (RACADM) commands, which were found by inspecting the 
RACADM utility source (Nielsen, 2014). However, a solution does not exist for iDRAC 4. As noted in 
the iLO Server Decommission section, the only way to truly ensure no confidential data persists on the 
BMC root file system is to physically destroy the BMC. Below are instructions to clear easily accessible 
information:
1) Under “DRAC 4” navigate to “Logs,” “System Event Log (SEL)” and click “Clear Log.” The 
System Event Log (SEL) keeps track o f battery voltage, clock settings, memory errors and BMC 
Intrusion detection (i.e. failed login attempts).
2) Under “DRAC 4” navigate to “Logs,” “DRAC 4 Log” and click “Clear Log.” The DRAC 4 Log 
keeps track o f user login, and established session information.
3) Under “DRAC 4” navigate to “Configuration,” “Network” and clear any network related 
information.
4) Under “DRAC 4” navigate to “Configuration,” “Alerts” and remove all alerts.
5) Under “DRAC 4” navigate to “Configuration,” “Users” and remove all users. The Users section 
stores user information and their associated access privileges.
6) Under “DRAC 4” navigate to “Configuration,” “Security” and “Generate a new Certificate 
Signing Request (CSR)” to overwrite the old one.
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7) Under “DRAC 4” navigate to “Configuration,” “Active Directory,” remove any domain name 
information and overwrite the old certificate.
Building a Metasploit Module
Metasploit is a powerful framework used by penetration testers to automate data reconnaissance and 
exploitation. In this section, we investigate how to install the Metasploit framework, how to build a basic 
module and, finally, how to create a more advanced scanner module to detect iLO and iDRAC related 
services.
Metasploit Set Up
First we need to set up the Metasploit framework on the dedicated server.
1) First install the dependencies:
sudo apt-get install ruby1.9.1 build-essential
2) Download the installer script:
wget http://downloads.metasploit.com/data/releases/metasploit- 
latest-linux-x64-installer.run
3) Next, give execute permissions to the file:
chmod +x metasploit-latest-linux-x64-installer.run
4) Now, run the installer:
sudo ./metasploit-latest-linux-x64-installer.run
5) Start the Metasploit service:
sudo /etc/init.d/metasploit start
6) Now we can launch Metasploit: 
sudo msfconsole
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Creating a New Module
Now that we have the Metasploit framework setup, we will create a simple “Hello W orld” module to 
get familiar with Metasploits’ modular based framework. The source code for this module can be found in 
the Appendix section under Source Code 1 -  hello_world.rb.
1) First navigate to exploits folder:
cd /opt/metasploit/apps/pro/msf3/modules/exploits
2) Navigate to targeted operating system.
3) Create a new folder for targeted service: 
mkdir <SERVICE_NAME>
4) Navigate into folder and create a new ruby script for the exploit module: 
touch <EXPLOIT_NAME>.rb
5) Open up the script in your favorite editor.
6) Load the core library: 
require 'msf/core'
7) Define the class:
class Metasploit3 < Msf::Auxiliary
8) Initialize the main section:
def initialize 
super(
'Name' => 'Hello World',
'Description' => 'Simple Hello World module.',
'Author' => [ 'Syler Clayton
<syler clayton[at]hotmail.com>'],
'License' => MSF_LICENSE,
'References' =>
[
['URL', 'Reference 1'],
['URL', 'Reference 2']
]
)
end
9) Now define the main function:
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def run
print good(”Hello World!”) 
end 
end
10) Now save the module.
11) Launch Metasploit:
sudo msfconsole
12) Reload modules: 
reload all
13) Now load the module:
use exploits/<SERVICE_NAME>/<EXPLOIT_NAME>
14) Show the options for the module: 
show options
15) Run the exploit: 
run
16) Below is a screenshot o f the module running:
msf> use auxiliary/scanner/ipir.i/hello_world 
msf auxiliary (hellQ_wor.li } > show options
Module options (auxiliary/scanner/ipmi/hello_world}:
Name Current Setting Required Description
ir.sf auxiliary ( )■ > run
1+1 Hello World!
Auxiliary module execution completed 
ir.sf auxiliary ( )■ > |
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Scanner Module to Detect iLO and iDRAC Services
H.D. Moore has done previous work writing a Metasploit module to detect and exploit IPMI Over 
LAN (Moore, 2013). However, a module for detecting BMC related services was non-existent. Now that 
we have a basic understanding o f the Metasploit framework and have created a simple “Hello World” 
module, we can create a more advanced module to scan and detect iLO and iDRAC related services. The 
module works by calling nmap with verbose reporting and operating system fingerprint flags set to look 
for iLO and iDRAC related services. For the command nmap -sV -F -O <HOST> the -sV  flag 
enables nmap version detection, the -F  flag scans only ports that are named in the services file, and the -  
O flag triggers OS detection (Nmap, 2014). The resulting output is parsed into hardware, operating 
system, and related services categories using regular expressions in grep. The regular expressions look for 
key identifiers related to iDRAC and iLO that is given by setting the OS detection flag in nmap. Key 
identifiers include the strings “Dell,” “iDRAC,” “HP,” and “iLO.” The OS detection flag works by 
looking at the MAC address combined with fingerprinting running services. Fingerprints o f known 
operating systems are referred to as, “reference fingerprints,” and the fingerprint identified by the nmap 
scan is known as a “subject fingerprint” (Nmap, 2014). The subject fingerprint of the MAC address and 
open/closed UDP/TCP ports along with other metadata is stored and compared against the nmap-os-db 
database to identify the operating system and service information (Nmap, 2014). Each service is split into 
“Port,” “State,” “Service” and “Version” categories and displayed to the user. This module was 100% 
effective in identifying both iLO and iDRAC BMC’s in our test bed (see steps 10 and 11 below) as well 
as correctly reporting, “No iLO or iDRAC related services found,” for non-BMC hosts (see step 9 below). 
An example o f formatted output to the user can be found below in steps 9, 10, and 11.
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To install the module:
1) Run the commands:
cd
/opt/metasploit/apps/pro/msf3/modules/auxiliary/scanner/ipmi 
sudo nano ipmi service scanner.rb
2) Copy the contents o f the source code included in the “Appendix” section under “Source 
Code 2” .
3) Launch Metasploit: 
sudo msfconsole
4) Reload modules: 
reload_all
5) Now load the module:
use auxiliary/scanner/ipmi/ipmi service scanner.rb
6) Show the options for the module: 
show options
7) Set the target host IP address: 
set RHOSTS <IP_ADDR>
8) Run the scanner: 
run
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9) Example o f the scanner running against a non BMC host:
m sf> use  a u x i l ia r y /s c a n n e r / ip m i / ip n L i_ s e r v ic e _ s c a n n e r
ir .s f  auxiliary ( } > set RHOSTS 10.10.10.4
RHOSTS => 10.10.10.4
msf auxiliary ( :vi i } > run
[+1 Scanning. Please wait...
I+l No iLO or iDRAC related services found 
I+I Scan complete.
Auxiliary module execution completed
10) Example o f the scanner running against a iLO host:
msf auxiliary{iimi_se: } > set RHOSTS 10.10.10.5
RHOSTS => 10.10.10.5
ir.sf auxiliary ( } > run
[+1 Scanning. Please wait...
[+1 iLO related services found on 10.10.10.5
i+I OS details: HP iLO or iLO 2 remote management interface 
[+1 FORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
I+l 22/tcp open ssh HF Integrated Lights-Out rapSSH 0.0.1 (protoc
ol 2.0}
23/tcp open telnet HF Integrated Lights-Out remote configuration te
lnetd
30/tcp open http HF Remote Lights-Out http config
443/tcp open ssl/http HF Remote Lights-Out http config
3339/tcp filtered ms-wbt-server
I+l Scan complete.
 Auxiliary module execution completed________________________________________
11) Example o f the scanner running against a iDRAC host:
msf auxiliary! mi_service_scaime: } > set RHOSTS 10.10.10.7 
RHOSTS => 10.10.10.7
msf auxiliary( i ; } > run
[+ 1  Scanning. Flease wait...
[+ 1  iDRAC related services found on 10.10.10.7
[+ 1  OS details: Dell Remote Access Controller 4 (DRAC 4)
I+l FORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
I+l 22/tcp open ssh Hocana eirtedded SSH (protocol 2.0}
30/tcp open http Dell Embedded Remote Access card htt.pd 1.0
443/tcp open ssl/https?
5900/tcp open drac-console Dell Remote Access Controller 4 console
I+l Scan complete.
 Auxiliary module execution completed_______________________________
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12) Example o f HP keywords showing up in network traffic during the nmap scan:
M
Stream Content
Follow TCP Stream
G ET  /  H T T P / l . O
H T T P / l .1 200  o k
C o n t e n t - T y p e : t e x t / h t m l
E x p i r e s :  F r i , 15  A p r  20 0 5  1 4 : 1 9 : 4 1  GMT
c a c h e - c o n t r o l : n o - c a c h e
c o n n e c t i o n :  c l o s e
C o n t e n t - L e n g t h :  1 5 0 1
< ! DO CTYPE HTML P U B L IC  " - / / W 3 C / / D T D  HTML 4 . 0  T r a n s i t i O n a l / / E N " >  
<! —
*
*  c o p v r i q h t  2 0 0 1 ,2 0 0 3  |Hewle t t - P a c k a r d lD e v e lo p m e n t  c o m p a n y ,  L .P .*
—>
chtm l >
<head>
< t i t l e >
D a t a  F ram e  -  B r o w s e r  n o t  h t t p  1 . 1  c o m p a t ib le
< / t i t l e>
< L IN K  R E L = " s t y l e s h e e t "  . T Y P E = " t e x t / c s s "  H R E F = " r i l o e . c s s " >  
< / h e a d >
< b o d y  c l a s s = ”d a t a "  b a c k g r o u n d = ”w e bb u m .g i f "  b g c o l o r = " f f f f f f " >  
< T A B L E  BO RDER^O  W ID T H = 1 0 0 %  C E L L P A D D IN G =0>
< tr>
< t d  c l a s s = " h e a d "  v a l i g n = " c e n t e r "  a l i g n = " c e n t e r " >
< b >
Y o u r  b ro w s e r  m u st  s u p p o r t  HTTP 1 . 1  t o  v ie w 1 LO web p a g e s .  P l e a s e  u s e  a
b r o w s e r  t h a t  s u p p o r t s  HTTP 1 . 1 ,  s u c h  a s  M i c r o s o f t  I n t e r n e t  E x p l o r e r .
13) Example o f Dell keywords showing up in network traffic during the nmap scan:
Follow TCP Stream _ □
Stream Content
GET /  H T T P /1 .0  
HTTP/ l . 1 200 OK
D a te :  Wed, 23 A p r  2014 2 1 :0 3 :1 4  
s e r v e r :  r a c _ o n e _ h t t p  1 . 0  
C o n t e n t - L e n g t h :  130 0  
c o n t e n t - T y p e :  t e x t / h t m l
< ! DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC  " - / / W 3 C / / D T D  HTML 3 .2  F i n a l / / E N " >  
ch tm l x h e a d x t i t l  e>|Remote A c c e s s  c o n t r o l  1 e r k / t i t l  e>
< s c r i p t  1 a n g u a g e = " j a v a s c r i  p t " > t o p . l o c a t i o n . r e p l a c e ( " h t t p s : / / "  + t o p . lo c a t io n . h o s t n a m e  + 
" : 4 4 3 / " ) ; < / s c r i p t >
< s t y l  e>
S P A N . d a t a - a r e a - p a g e - t i t l e  {  FON T-W EIG HT: n o rm a l;  F O N T -S IZ E :  1 4 p t ;  COLOR: #00 66CC ; FONT- 
F A M IL Y : A r i a !  }
TD  {  f o n t - w e i g h t :  n o rm a l;  f o n t - s i z e :  lO p t ;  C O L O R :b la c k ;  f o n t - f a m i l y :  A r i a l ;  }
< / s t y l  e x / h e a a >
< n o s c r i p t x b r x t a b l e  c e l l s p a c i n g = " 0 ” c e l  1 p a d d in g = " 0 ” b o r r ip r = "0 "> < t r x t d  
w id t h = "1 5 "> & n b s p ;< / t d x t d x s p a n  c l a s s = ”d a t a - a r e a - p a g e - t i t l e " > T h e  |DRAC 4| W e b -b a se d  
i n t e r f a c e  r e q u i r e s  J a v a s c r i p t  t o  d i s p l a y  c o n te n t  c o r r e c t l y . < / s p a n x b r x b r x / t d x t d  
w i d t h = " 1 5 " x / t d x / t r x t r x t d  w id t h = " 1 5 ”> & n b sp ;< / t d x r t d  a l i g n = " l e f t "  v a l i g r » = " t o p " > T h i s  
b ro w se r  i s  c o n f i g u r e d  t o  n o t  a l l o w  s c r i p t i n g .  T o  e n a b le  s c r i p t i n g , < u l x l i > v e r i f y  t h a t  
t h e  c u r r e n t  b ro w se r  s e c u r i t y  l e v e l  a l l o w s  a c t i v e  s c r i p t i n g .  E i t h e r  lo w e r  t h e  s e c u r i t y  
p r  e n a b le  a c t i v e  s c r i p t i n g . < / l i x l i > l f  yo u  a r e  u s in g  i n t e r n e t  E x p lo r e r ,  ad d  t h e  
d r a c  4 1 URL t o  t h e  l i s t  o f  T r u s t e d  S i t e s .  M ake  s u r e  t h a t  b o th  < c o d e > h t t p : / / < / c o d e >  and
< c o d e > h t t p s : / / < / c o d e >  U R L 's  a r e  ad ded  t o  t h e  l i s t . < / l i x l i > R e f e r  t o  y o u r  w e b -b ro w se r  
d o c u m e n ta t io n  f o r  m ore i n f o r m a t io n  r e g a r d in g  s c r i p t i n g . < / l i x / u l x / t d x t d  
wi d th = "1 5 "> & n b s p ;  < / t d x / t r x / t a b l  e x / n o s c r i  p t>
< / h tm l >]
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Impacts on UA Environment
A few weeks after my first presentation on IPMI security, I received a response from Kathleen Boyle, 
Chief Security Officer o f UAFs Office o f Information Technology (OIT). She wanted to know the IP 
addresses, make and model o f servers, and any identifying information stored on them. She stated that she 
would, “like to track down the groups who surpluses them to make them aware,” (K. Boyle, personal 
communication, November 21, 2014). I responded with the information she requested. She concluded, 
“you picked a very good topic... we'd also be interested in any suggestions you have on how to sanitize 
these configs when the servers are decommissioned,” (K. Boyle, personal communication, November 21, 
2014). A week later, Dr. Hay told me that she had sent out a statewide email to the University o f Alaska 
(UA) network informing staff to be aware to wipe IPMI configuration before sending equipment to 
surplus. A few weeks later, I received an email asking me to present at the, “OIT Distributed Technical 
Summit,” on March 17, 2014, which I accepted.
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Conclusions
In conclusion, IPMI is a powerful utility for administrators. However, with great power comes great 
responsibility to ensure the security o f the system lest control o f the system fall into unauthorized hands. 
There are security vulnerabilities in the IPMI protocol and the various vendor implementations that need 
to be addressed. Best practices to avoid unauthorized access include the following:
• IPMI interfaces should only be exposed on a private network.
• IPMI software should be updated routinely.
• Strong Encryption should be enabled.
• Cipher 0 should be DISABLED.
• Accounts should follow a strong password policy.
• Accounts and configuration should be wiped before server decommission.
Depending on the vendor, BMC firmware is either publically available or only available to users with 
a service contract. IBM and Oracle both require service contracts (Farmer, 2013). Vendors typically 
abandon providing firmware and security updates to old BMC hardware. Therefore, a call for an open 
standard o f IPMI supported hardware and firmware is needed to give users the ability to continue the 
support of outdated hardware similar to that o f open source router firmware projects. This means that 
vendors need to be more transparent with their implementations and provide documentation and source 
code to their end users. More importantly, the IPMI specification needs to be revised to address issues 
directly related to the protocol such as Cipher 0 (passwordless authentication), the ability to dump hashed 
passwords and the storage o f unencrypted passwords on the hardware (Moore, 2013). The IPMI 
specification is maintained by Intel and has not seen a major release since 2004, with minor revisions 
dating February 11, 2014 (Farmer, 2013). However, none o f the revisions have formally addressed the 
Cipher 0 and IPMI 2.0 RAKP Authentication Remote Password Hash Retrieval Vulnerability. Finally, we
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hope we have made a convincing argument that IPMI security is a recent, relevant, and widespread issue. 
Awareness and best practices are needed.
Future Work
The scope o f this project was just the tip o f the IPMI security related issue iceberg. There are a 
multitude o f IPMI supported hardware and services by vendors we did not discuss in this paper. Further 
investigation of these other vendors is needed:
1) Supermicro -  Supermicro Intelligent Management.
2) IBM/Lenovo -  Integrated Management Module (IMM).
3) Fujitsu -  Integrated Remote Management Controller (iRMC).
4) Oracle - Integrated Lights Out Manager (ILOM).
Finally, I plan to give another presentation similar to the one at the OIT Distributed Tech Summit to 
InfraGard on August 5th, 2014. InfraGard is a partnership between the FBI and private sectors.
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Appendix
This section contains a glossary, a revision history and a source code section for the IPMI Server 
Scanner Metasploit module.
Glossary
• IPM I -  Intelligent Platform Management Interface
• BMC -  Baseboard Management Controller
• iDRAC -  Integrated Dell Remote Access Card
• iLO -  Integrated Lights Out Interface
• C ipher 0 -  Allows passwordless authentication.
• M etasploit -  Penetration testing framework.
Revision History
Version Date Notes
1.0 November 5, 2013 Basic outline and documentation o f previous work.
1.1 November 11, 2013 iLO configuration and network diagram.
1.2 November 20, 2013 Added BMC Setup section.
1.3 December 1, 2013 Added Recovering Data section.
1.4 January 20, 2014 Added Clearing Settings for Decommission and Configuration 
sections.
1.5 January 28, 2014 Updated Clearing Settings section.
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1.6 February 8, 2014 Formatted previous work to project write up template.
1.7 February 12, 2014 Added Abstract and Acknowledgements sections.
1.8 February 15, 2014 Added Introduction section.
1.9 February 22, 2014 Added Metasploit section.
2.0 February 28, 2014 Documented Metasploit module
2.1 March 1, 2014 Added IPMI Background and Related work sections.
2.2 March 15, 2014 Revised IPMI Security Threats subsections.
2.3 March 23, 2014 Added source code for iLO scanner.
2.4 March 25, 2014 Expanded Introduction section to reflect progress. Wrote IPMI 
Security Threats section.
2.5 March 27, 2014 Added iDRAC research section (Stretch goal met).
2.6 March 30, 2014 Wrote Conclusions section.
2.7 April 2, 2014 Updated sources and revised entire document.
2.8 April 4, 2014 Added Project Goals section.
2.9 April 7, 2014 Added Future Work section.
3.0 April 12, 2014 Added revisions based on feedback from Brandon Marken.
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3.1 April 15, 2014 Added Example o f Misconfiguration and Impact on UA Environment 
sections.
3.2 April 16, 2014 Redacted IP addresses. Created BMC Diagram. Added partial 
revisions based on feedback from Dr. Brian Hay.
3.3 April 17, 2014 Reworked first few sections based on feedback from Dr. Brian Hay.
3.4 April 18, 2014 Added Glossary section. Reorganized sections and formatted Table of 
Contents. Reworked remaining sections based on feedback from Dr. Brian 
Hay.
3.6 April 21, 2014 Changed font for commands/code to Courier New 14. Redacted UAF 
email. Clarified file system access in IPMI protocol section. Addressed 
Related Work citations and reviewed entire document for citation issues. 
Gave lifetime o f BMC in Vendor Implementation section. Addressed file 
system access in iLO Recovering Data and Server Decommission sections. 
Expanded iLO and iDRAC server decommission sections to explain 
recoverable data. Addressed file system access in the iDRAC Server 
Decommission section. Added introduction to Creating a New Module 
section. Added further investigation o f IPMI 1.5 authentication in the 
Enabling IPMI Over LAN section. Addressed IPMI protocol specification 
in Conclusions section. Added demonstrations o f Metasploit modules. 
Added source for Hello World module in Appendix. Added detail to 
Metasploit module service scanner methods.
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3.7 April 22, 2014 Changed code/comments font to Courier New. Added revisions in 
IPMI Over LAN and Scanner Module to Detect iLO and iDRAC Services 
sections.
3.8 April 22, 2014 Added a pcap analysis o f the IPMI over LAN 1.5 authentication 
process for iDRAC 4 and discussed the implications o f this method in 
greater detail. Provided further analysis of how nmap detects BMCs.
3.9 April 23, 2014 Changed Enabling IPMI Over LAN to IPMI Over LAN. Created new 
section titled Enabling IPMI Over LAN. Provided more description in the 
IPMI Over LAN example. Fixed off by one error in the steps describing 
the Metasploit module. Added screenshots o f key identifiers in the 
Metasploit module steps.
4.0 April 23, 2014 Received feedback from Dr. Kara Nance. Changed font to Times New 
Roman. Had Angela Peterson proof read and edit paper. Fixed citations to 
conform to the MLA format.
4.1 May 1, 2014 Received feedback from Victoria Avery at the Writing Center. 
Changed format to APA. Fixed grammatical errors.
Table 1 - Revision History
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Source Code
Source Code 1 -  hello_world.rb
require 'msf/core'
class Metasploit3 < Msf::Auxiliary 
def initialize 
super(
'Name' => 'Hello World',
'Description' => 'Simple Hello World module.',
'Author' => [ 'Syler Clayton
<syler clayton[at]hotmail.com>'],
'License' => MSF_LICENSE,
'References' =>
[
['URL', 'Reference 1'],
['URL', 'Reference 2']
]
)
end
def run
print good(”Hello World!”) 
end 
end
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Source Code 2 -  ipmi_service_scanner.rb
##
# This module requires Metasploit: http//metasploit.com/download
# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework 
##
require 'msf/core'
class Metasploit3 < Msf::Auxiliary 
include Msf::Auxiliary::Nmap 
def initialize 
super(
'Name' => ’iLO v1 and iDRAC4 IPMI Information Discovery’,
'Description' => 'Discover host information through nmap
probes.',
'Author' => [ 'Syler Clayton <swclayton3[at]alaska.edu>'],
'License' => MSF_LICENSE,
'References' =>
[
['URL', 'http://fish2.com/ipmi/'],
['URL',
'https://community.rapid7.com/community/metasploit/blog/2 013/07/02/a- 
penetration-testers-guide-to-ipmi']
]
)
end
def run
print good(”Scanning. Please wait...”)
rhosts = datastore['RHOSTS']
nmapResults = %x<nmap -sV -F -O #{rhosts}>
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nmapFilter = %x<echo '#{nmapResults}' | grep -o [0-9][0-9] 
checkDell = %x<echo '#{nmapFilter}' | grep -o "Dell"> 
checkiLO = %x<echo '#{nmapFilter}' | grep -o "HP"> 
checkOS = %x<echo '#{nmapResults}' | grep -o "OS details: 
if checkDell != ""
print good("iDRAC related services found on "+rhosts) 
print good(checkOS)
print_good("PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION")
print good(nmapFilter) 
elsif checkiLO != ""
print good("iLO related services found on "+rhosts) 
print good(checkOS)
print_good("PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION")
print good(nmapFilter) 
else
print good("No iLO or iDRAC related services found") 
end
print good("Scan complete.") 
end 
end
*/.*>
" *>
